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Teaching the Republican Child: Three Antebellum
Stories about Law, Schooling, and the
Construction of American Families
Michael Grossberg"
As my contribution to this Symposium, I want to tell three
stories from the past. But before telling stories from long ago, I
would like to preface them with one from the present.-
Recently Fran Cook, a Spanish teacher in the Cincinnati sub-
urb of Alexandria, Kentucky, confronted an unruly student named
Andy Bray.1 She talked with Bray's mother, met with school offi-
cials, and tried a variety of ways of keeping him from disrupting her
class. But neither negotiations with his mother nor detentions de-
terred Bray. Exasperated, Cook turned to the law. She secured a
restraining order, filed a charge of terroristic threatening in juve-
nile court, and sued Bray. Deciding that Bray's conduct had "clearly
exceeded the bounds of common decency," the jury awarded Cook
$8700 for emotional distress and medical bills and $25,000 in puni-
tive damages.
In a story on the case, an Associated Press reporter tried to put
the case in context: "'he old way of handling troublemakers was to
haul them outside for a paddling, keep them after school or suspend
them. The new way is to haul them into court-to file a lawsuit or
press criminal charges 2 The reporter went on to contend that in
the past it had been parents and students who went to court, now it
is teachers.'
The story of teacher Cook and student Bray and the reporter's
assertion of changed legal practices highlight the three interrelated
points I want to make. First, the story is but the most recent in a
series of struggles over the intergenerational transfer of values and
skills that date from the dawn of the republic. Second, it is also the
product of a past in which the law has been a crucial site and an
equally crucial language for battles over the allocation of power
* Professor of History, Indiana University, and Editor, American Historical
Reuiew; B.A. 1972, University of California, Santa Barbara; Ph.D. 1979, Brandeis
University.
1. Mark 1& Shellgran, Teachers Turn to Courts to Control Students, THE COM.
APPEAL (Memphis), Sept. 18, 1995, at LA.
2. Id.
3. Id
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between American families and the state. Third, cases like this one
have long been critical to the construction of popular and legal con-
ceptions of families and schooling. Through these assertions, I want
to offer my response to the symposium question: What is a family?
My answer is that a family is, at least in part, a legal construction
forged in conflicts like the one between Cook and Bray.
I want to make that argument by going back to the 1840s and
1850s to tell the tales of three students: Sarah Roberts, Lewis
Winchell, and Thomas Wal. Only one of their stories would be long
remembered, yet all three are worth retelling because they repre-
sent a particular kind of story. Like Cook's tale, they are courtroom
stories about schooling; that is, trial tales with interrelated but
distinct lessons about the role of law in battles over how to educate
the young. Then and now, such conflicts raise critical questions
about public definitions of families. In doing so, they also bring to
the fore concerns about the allocation of power between families and
the state, as well as the autonomy and authority of individual fami-
ly members and public agents, like teachers and school administra-
tors. Always more than merely a place to learn rudimentary skills,
the school has been a primary site for such conflicts since at least
the late eighteenth century.
Together, these three stories raise important questions about
how contests over the authority of families and schools and the
agency of individual children, parents, and teachers helped con-
struct the American family. In particular, I think the stories high-
light a persistent problem identified by Lee Teitelbaum in another
essay in this Symposium: "reconciling respect for the 'sovereignty' of
the family-its intimacy, particularity, and variety-with the opera-
tion of public power."4 And I do not want to repeat the standard
storyline of family change, which posits the inevitable erosion of
family authority as a result of the assumption of family functions,
from education to value transmission, by other institutions and the
rise to dominance of affection as a central household bond. Instead,
I would like to use these stories to suggest a more complicated expe-
rience in which families remain powerful institutions though con-
stantly buffeted by change, always interacting with other institu-
tions, and are in the process of being continually redefined. There-
fore, I will explain why I think these stories are worth telling, then
briefly tell the three tales, finally suggesting the moral I find in
them.
4. Lee Teitelbaum, The Family as a System, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 537, 548 (this
issue).
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I. WHY TELL COURTROOM STORIES?
Let me begin by suggesting that this trio of students found
themselves in courtrooms because questions about how, where, and
what to teach the young became highly charged in antebellum
America. A new environmentalism and a new sense of the impor-
tance of childrearing combined with a republican vision of the young
as the perpetuators of political progress to invest great importance
in the intergenerational transmission of skills, knowledge, and val-
ues. Schools became the repository of a new faith in education as
the engine of individual mobility and source of equal opportunity.
They were invested with multiple, often clashing missions: produc-
ing an educated, disciplined workforce; attacking poverty and crime;
and inculcating Christian morality. Parents generally accepted the
growing control of the schools over teaching these lessons and ac-
quiesced in their consequent loss of authority.5 However, they re-
sisted a complete transfer of responsibilities and instead fought over
the creation of new boundary lines between the autonomy of the
family and the authority of state agencies like the schools.6 The
legal system became a major forum for boundary skirmishes. Out of
courtroom contests like these three came legal rules and phrases
that helped define the place of the young in antebellum society and
helped create an American law of education. Those legal rules and
phrases, in turn, became building blocks in the larger construction
project of the era: redefining the family.
These particular cases went to law because of unresolvable
conflicts between the students, their parents, their teachers, and
school officials over the three R's-not reading, 'riting, and
'rithmetic, but rather race, religion, and the rod. They were not typi-
cal cases. Most school litigation concerned questions of finances,
property, and administrative authority And only Sarah Roberts's
case was deemed important enough to become become a major legal
precedent. Nevertheless, these cases are significant not because of
statistical representativeness or doctrinal importance but because
they offer us telling glimpses of the legal construction of children,
families, and education in a critical era.
5. CARL F. KAESThE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COION SCHOOLS AND AMERI-
CAN SOCIETY, 1780-1860, at 158-61 (1983).
6. For the most useful discussion of school changes in the era, see id. at 66-
225; RUSH WELTER, POPULAR EDUCATION AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT IN AMERICA
90-97 (1962) (discussing faith in education).
7. See AARON BENAVOT, LAW AND SHAPING OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, 1785-1954,
at 43-76 (1987) (discussing 19th-century education); see also id at 70 (charting dis-
tribution of various categories of school litigation).
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The cases are useful sources largely because a trial that at-
tracted attention and inflamed passions is the centerpiece of each
story. As a result, each case is best understood as "a precedent of
legal experience." Unlike precedents of legal rules and more
meaningful than the label "popular trial," the phrase is intended to
suggest the multidimensional impact of trials like these three. Such
cases enter the collective memory as ways for both laypeople and
lawyers to construct legal claims and conceive of legal relationships.
Though difficult to measure in precise and verifiable terms, prece-
dents of legal experience affect not only the people directly caught
up in the dramatic trials themselves. Their influence continues long
after the particulars of a case are forgotten. They become embedded
in the very fabric of our legal culture as ways to translate individu-
al and collective problems into legal disputes.
Cases like these are, obviously, particular kinds of experiences;
and "eiperience" is one of the troubling words whose seemingly
clear meaning masks confusion. I want to use the term to mean
both the external influences to which people react and the interior
consciousness of that reaction. I would also like to add the recogni-
tion that these influences combine to create individuals through
their experiences. Using such a conception of experience under-
scores the reality that individuals are constituted through their
experiences. In other words, the evidence of experience includes
both records of individual agency and of the social systems that
affect individual action.' Adding a legal prefix suggests that legal
experiences must be explained as both reactions to past events and
as events that themselves help create particular legal identities for
those who undergo them, directly and indirectly.
Thinking of law, then, in such constitutive terms compels us to
address issues of individual agency and to ask how this trio of stu-
dents and their families became active agents in the legal process. I
argue that the experiences of students like Sarah, Lewis, and
Thomas should be included in the legal history of childhood, fami-
lies, and education. These children and their parents and advisors
were active agents in the legal process, yet the evidence of experi-
ences like theirs has been generally lost in larger studies or ignored
by historians of law, schooling, and households.9
8. See Kathleen Canning, Feminist History After the Linguistic Turn:
Historicizing Discourse and Experience, 19 SIGNS 368, 373-78 (1994) (discussing
historicizing experience); Joan W. Scott, The Evidence of Experience, 17 CRITICAL
INQUIRY 773, 773-97 (1991) (same).
9. See, e.g., Michael Grossberg, "'ighting Faiths" and the Challenges of Legal
History, J. SOC. HIST. 191, 191-201 (1991) (discussing challenges of legal history); N.
Ray Hiner, "Look into Families": The New History of Children and the Family and
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As a partial corrective, I suggest that storytelling is one way to
recover the meaning of individual legal experiences. Narratives
allow us to incorporate subjective, contextualized, and particular
accounts into our understanding of the dynamics of social change.
They open up issues about who uses the law and how and why. In
doing so, stories underscore the often neglected point that what
happens in a courtroom is intimately connected to a larger world
and set of events beyond the courthouse door. Consequently, court-
room stories allow us "to discover the existence of a much wider
range of lived institutional formations as well as a wider range of
routes by which the present emerged from the past.""
Like other courtroom stories, the timing and setting of the
three tales I want to tell are critical to how and why they occurred
and to their meaning. The stories all come from the public schools
of Massachusetts in the last decades before the Civil War. The Bay
State already had a long-established tradition of educating the
young. Its public and private schools served a growing student pop-
ulation and sustained one of the highest attendance rates in the
republic. By the 1840s, the state's ethnic, racial, and geographic
diversity challenged its educational commitments and methods."
Equally significant, Massachusetts schools spawned conflicts like
those which would erupt into courtroom contests between schools
Its Implications for Educational Research and Policy, Address at theConference on
Education and the Family passim (June 17-18, 1988) (unpublished draft, on file with
author). But see DAVID TYACK, TOWARD A SOCIAL HISTORY OF LAW AND PUBLIC EDU-
CATION 2-5 (1982) (suggesting contours for social history of law and schooling).
10. Frank Munger, Narrativity and Class, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of
the Law and Society Association 10 (June 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author). For a very helpful discussion about law and storytelling, see the special
issue of the Michigan Law Review devoted to the subject. Symposium, Legal Story-
telling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989). For a particularly compelling example, see
Laura H. Korobkin, The Maintenance of Mutual Confidence: Sentimental Strategies at
the Adultery Trial of Henry Ward Beecher, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 passim (1995)
(discussing Beecher-Tilton scandal and subsequent litigation through story). On the
general issue of history and narrative, see Peter Burke, The History of Events and
the Revival of Narrative, in NEW PERSPECTIVES IN HISTORICAL WRITING 233, 233-46
(Peter Burke ed., 1991). Finally, for a more sustained discussion of the intersection
of experience, microhistory, narratives, and trials, see MICHAEL GROSSBERG, A JUDG-
MENT FOR SOLOMON: THE DHIAUTEVILLE CASE AND LEGAL EXPERIENCE IN ANTEBEL-
LUM AMERICA passim (1996).
11. For discussions of schooling in Massachusetts during this era, see generally
SAMUEL BOWLES & HERBERT GINTIS, SCHOOLING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA: EDUCATION
REFORI AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF ECONOMIC LFE 23-24, 27-29, 160-76 (1976);
CARL F. KAESTLE & MARIS A. VINOVSKIS, EDUCATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN NINE-
TEENTH-CENTURY MASSACHUSETTS passim (1980); MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE IRONY OF
EARLY SCHOOL REFORM passim (1968); STANLEY K. SCHULTZ, THE CULTURE FACTORY:
BOSTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 1789-1860, at 47-309 (1973).
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and families around the republic.
A central focus of those conflicts was the tendency of "the state,
through local school committees and fledgling state education agen-
cies, strenuously [to] assert[ ] an increasing authority for teachers
over children, in competition with parents."' Consequently, re-
calling the setting and the sequential way in which the cast of char-
acters in these stories were drawn into the courtroom, and their
fate once there, not only returns a necessary indeterminacy to their
tales but suggests that cases like these ought to be considered, in
Richard Wightman Fox's phrase, "culture-shaping and culture-dis-
closing" events. 3
These three Massachusetts courtroom stories are significant,
then, not in conventional social science terminology as case studies
or representative examples that somehow reflect the larger society,
but rather in microhistory terms as experiences that are both the
products of, and sources of, change. In their details they help identi-
fy the critical individual and social forces that produce interactions
like these.'4 Thus, despite the tendency of most courtroom 'story-
tellers to make trials simply mirrors of society, cases like these
three are not mere reflections of the broader culture at a particular
time. They are specific kinds of social dramas that illustrate the
interactive reality of legal experiences. In trials like these three,
external beliefs, interests, and other forces are siphoned through
the particular rules, practices, and institutions of the law. As a
result, inside the courtroom they acquire distinctive meanings,
which are then broadcast to the public through client stories,
lawyers' arguments, witness testimony, and judges' verdicts. These
in turn help construct popular images of social relations. It is in this
interactive manner that trials become active shapers of a culture,
not merely its reflections. For that reason, trials like these three
can be used to reconstruct "the relationship (about which we know
12. Carl F. Kaestle, Social Change, Discipline, and the Common School in Early
Nineteenth-Century America, 9 J. NTERDISCIPLINARY HIsT. 1, 3-4 (1978).
13. Richard W. Fox, Intimacy on Trial: Cultural Meanings of the Beecher-Tilton
Affair, in THE POWER OF CULTURE 103, 131 (Richard W. Fox & T.J. Lears eds.,
1993).
14. See EDWARD BERENSON, THE TRIAL OF MADAME CAILLAUX 6-12 (1992) (not-
ing this approach to understanding history through "one exemplary event or person");
Giovanni Levi, On Micro History, in NEW PERSp. IN HIST. WRITING 93 (demonstrating
significance of microhistory). Critically, Frank Munger argues that narratives must go
beyond making the point that historical actors create institutions and simultaneously
their actions are constructed by forces produced by those institutions: "Historical
work is full of such simultaneous mutual construction, but the hard part is choosing
which elements beyond the historical actor's own consciousness are important. And
this is where the shouting begins." Munger, supra note 9, at 12.
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so little) between individual lives and the context in which they
unfold." 5
In summary, then, I want to argue that a microhistory of court-
room stories that concentrates on the courtroom as a site for both
cultural revelation and cultural shaping can suggest how trials
enter popular and professional consciousness to become part of the
process of legal change. Such an approach, I hope, makes the stories
of trials as precedents of legal experience worth recovering and
retelling.
A Sarah Roberts
Sarah Roberts was five years old in 1849 and ready for school.
Much like another African-American girl in Topeka, Kansas, a cen-
tury later, Sarah had to walk past five primary schools before arriv-
ing at one of two schools reserved for Boston's black children. 6
Sarah's father, printer Benjamin Roberts, had had enough. He con-
sidered the choice of schooling for his daughter a fundamental pa-
rental right and duty, so he decided to challenge the city's policy of
racial segregation and enrolled Sarah in a school for whites. She
attended that school for a month but was expelled solely because of
her race. Her father sued the city claiming that expulsion from the
neighborhood school violated his daughter's constitutional rights.
The suit raised troubling questions about the role of schools in de-
termining the status of families and the opportunities of individu-
als. Roberts v. City of Boston' would become the legal title for
Sarah's courtroom story.'
Her case was the culmination of growing agitation over racially
segregated schools in Boston; it also initiated a new series of con-
flicts. Separate schools for black Bostonians dated from the 1790s,
15. Carlo Ginzburg, Checking the Evidence: The Judge and the Historian, 18
CRITICAL INQUIRY 79, 90 (1991). For a discussion of social dramas, see VICTOR TURN-
ER, DRAMAS, FIELDS, AND METAPHORS 23-57 (1974).
16. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 486 n.1 (1954) (noting segre-
gation in Topeka schools in 1953).
17. 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849).
18. JIM CROW IN BOSTON: THE ORIGIN OF THE SEPARATE BUT EQUAL DOCTRINE
passim (Leonard W. Levy & Douglas L. Jones eds., 1974) [hereinafter JIM CROW];
LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COIMNWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW
109-17 (1957); Arthur B. Darling, Prior to Little Rock in American Education.: The
Roberts Case of 1849-50, 72 MASS. HIST. SOC'Y PROC. 122, 126-42 (1963); J. Morgan
Kousser, "The Supremacy of Equal Rights": The Struggle Against Racial Discrimina-
tion in Antebellum Massachusetts and the Foundations of the Fourteenth Amendment,
82 NW. U. L. REV. 941, 968-69, 973-75, 986-88 (1988); Leonard W. Levy & Harlan
Phillips, The Roberts Case: Source of the "Separate but Equal" Doctrine, 56 AM. HIST.
REV. 510, 510-18 (1951).
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when racial insults and mistreatment drove a group of African-
American parents to demand their own schools. Local officials at
first resisted the demand, but in 1804 a private school was estab-
lished and soon public funds were devoted to separate schools. Con-
flicts continued, however, particularly over the school committee's
decision to hire white teachers and complaints of poor instruction
and inadequate facilities. By the early 1840s, when African Ameri-
cans constituted about two percent of Boston's population, growing
numbers of the city's blacks began to see integration as the solution.
The city's rising abolitionist cadres, already engaged in what would
be successful campaigns against the last vestiges of formal segrega-
tion-separate public accommodations and bans against interracial
marriage-joined their struggle. By pinpointing the use of race as a
basis of legal distinctions and citizenship rights, abolitionists made
all forms of segregation suspect. African-American parents and their
allies petitioned the school committee and, when met with rejection,
organized boycotts. Their protests arose while the Boston schools
were already under fire from reformers, most notably the secretary
of the state school board, Horace Mann, for incompetent, archaic,
and often brutal teaching. At the same time, school desegregation
campaigns triumphed in several Massachusetts towns and cities.
As would happen again in the future, the growing campaign
against Boston's segregated schools split the community.' Though
apparently most Africans Americans supported the integration
demands, many did not. Equally important, much of the effective
opposition to desegregation came from wealthy Whigs, not just from
the usually suspected lower-class whites." As the conflict heated
up, the combatants voiced the full array of charges and counter-
charges that would echo in debates over racial segregation in
schools into our own time. Integrationists argued that separate
schools were arbitrary and unlawful, reinforced prejudices, stymied
needed interracial cooperation, and resulted in inferior schools often
at long distances for black children. In addition to racist arguments
of African-American inferiority, segregationists countered that re-
moving the color line would be detrimental for blacks who needed
special education and would generate white flight from the schools
and the city. They also insisted that the black schools were just as
good and convenient as the white schools and that only a minority
19. DERRICK A. BELL JR, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 364-68 (2d ed.
1980).
20. See Kousser, supra note 18, at 982-85 (providing systematic analysis of the
case).
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of agitators wanted change.2'
At base, both sides agreed not only that all children should be
educated but that education should be equal. Just as critical, both
also subscribed to the growing conviction that education was the
key to life success. Popular ideology encouraged most American
families to define childrearing as preparation for, in Isaac
Kramnick's telling phrase, the "race for life."' Believing in the pos-
sibility of generational advancement through education, mothers
and fathers demanded that every restraint on their children be
removed before they entered the race; doing so became part of the
their parental responsibilities. Indeed it may well have been that
"[d]uring the nineteenth century no group in the United States had
a greater faith in the equalizing power of schooling or a clearer
understanding of the democratic promise of public education than
did black Americans."'
Finally, both sides in the debate also turned to the increasingly
important political dialect of rights talk to express their clashing
meanings of equal education. Even then, rights talk offered an al-
ready rich and varied vocabulary through which groups could ex-
plain their separate identities and needs. For example, an August
1849 meeting of African Americans resolved "Tt]hat believing as we
do, that special legislation, regulated by complexion or any physical
differences, is anti-Republican and anti-Christian, we shall ever be
found using our best exertions for the supremacy of equal
rights."24 Other black Bostonians, however, much like the original
creators of the separate schools, argued that equal rights could only
be found in separate schools. They sought equality through better
facilities and control over instructors. For example, John H. Rob-
erts, a black day-laborer, defended segregated schools as necessary
retreats in a viciously racist society and contended that "colored
schools, properly constructed [were] characterized by the spirit of
equality, of enterprise, emulation, and friendship."26 Conversely,
Thomas P. Smith, a graduate of a segregated Boston school and
21. Id at 970-92.
22. ISAAC KRANIciK, REPUBLICANiISh AND BOURGEOIS RADICAsM: POLITICAL
IDEOLOGY IN LATE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND AND AMERICA 5-18 (1990).
23. DAVID B. TYACK, THE ONE BEST SYSTEM, A HISTORY OF URBAN EDUCATION
110 (1974).
24. Kousser, supra note 18, at 941 (quoting Resolution introduced by William C.
Nell, adopted by a meeting of blacks at the Belknap Street Independent Baptist
Church (Aug. 27, 1849) in THE LIBERATOR (Boston), Sept. 7, 1849, at 143, col.1) (em-
phasis omitted).
25. Id at 367.
26. JlIf CROW, supra note 18, at 132.
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former superintendent at Phillips Academy in Andover, explained
that if he thought that "colored schools stood directly in the way of
our rights" then he would fight to close them. But he discerned "no
baleful influences, no degradation, no oppression or prejudice,
caused by colored schools." ' Whites parroted both these argu-
ments.
Faced with an intransigent school committee, Benjamin Rob-
erts resorted to law. Relying on an 1845 statute, he asked the Com-
mon Pleas Court to assess damages against the city for unlawfully
excluding Sarah from her neighborhood school. Rebuffed, he ap-
pealed the decision to the state's high tribunal, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court, and turned his plea into a constitutional challenge that
invoked the state's "Declaration of Rights" and its promise of equali-ty.2
As Sarah's case wound its way through the system, it not only
became the symbol of division within the city over racially separat-
ed schools, it revealed that what Martha Minow has called "the
dilemma of difference"' lay at the heart of the emerging American
educational order. That dilemma, she argues, arises with two funda-
mentally contradictory and irresolvable questions: "[W]hen does
treating people differently emphasize their differences and stigma-
tize or hinder them on that basis? and when does treating people
the same become insensitive to their difference and likely to stigma-
tize or hinder them on that basis?"0 She rightly notes that the
"problems of inequality can be exacerbated both by treating mem-
bers of minority groups the same as members of the majority and
by treating the two groups differently."3 Resolution of this policy
conundrum became critical to legal definitions of family rights and
duties at any particular moment in time. Through legal experiences
like Sarah's, the courtroom became a place that reinforced and
institutionalized, without ever permanently resolving, the dilemma.
Such experiences would help make the law a primary language for
contests over its meaning.
In the Roberts case, the power of the law to articulate issues of
equal opportunity was most apparent in the august chambers of the
Supreme Judicial Court. In a widely reported courtroom clash,
Sarah's lawyers and those of the school committee agreed that the
27. Darling, supra note 18, at 136.
28. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 214 (1845); see also Kousser, supra note 18, at 969 (not-
ing that Roberts relied on 1845 statute for relief).
29. MARTHA MiNow, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 20 (1990).
30. Id.
31. Id.
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state's Declaration of Rights guaranteed equal treatment to all
citizens. They also agreed that the school committee had the au-
thority to make distinctions among students. But they differed fun-
damentally about the use of race, or as both put it, "complexion," as
a basis for distinctive treatment.
In a lengthy brief, future United States Senator Charles
Sumner and Robert Morris, the state's second black lawyer, told
Sarah's story. They are credited with first articulating the idea of
"equality before the law," later enshrined in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment that then-Senator Sumner helped enact.32 Sarah's lawyers
insisted that the schools were to be
maintained for the benefit of the whole town, as it is the wise policy
of the law to give all the inhabitants equal privileges for the educa-
tion of their children in the public schools. Nor is it in the power of
the majority to deprive the minority of this privilege.3
Sumner and Morris also addressed one side of the dilemma of differ-
ence: "MThe separation of the schools, so far from being for the bene-
fit of both races, is an injury to both. It tends to create a feeling of
degradation in the blacks and of prejudice and uncharitableness in
the whites."' 4 Attacking the caste system created by segregation
and proclaiming their commitment to an integrationist ideal,
Sumner and Morris concluded that
[t]he school is the little world in which the child is trained for the
larger world of life. It must, therefore, cherish and develop the
virtues and the sympathies which are employed in the larger
world,... beginning there those relations of equality which our
Constitution and laws promise to all .... Prejudice is the child of
ignorance. It is sure to prevail where people do not know each oth-
er. Society and intercourse are means established by Providence for
human improvement. They remove antipathies, promote mutual
adaptation and conciliation, and establish relations of reciprocal
regard.-"
Peleg Chandler, lawyer for the school committee, conservative
Whig, foe of abolition, and a leading law writer, told a far different
story. He championed the right of school authorities to classify stu-
dents in the manner they thought most appropriate. Race, he ar-
gued, was a legitimate basis for distinctive classification. He then
32. Darling, supra note 18, at 129.
33. Charles Sumner, Argument of Charles Sumner, Esq., Against the Constitu-
tionality of Separate Colored Schools, in the Case of Sarah C. Roberts vs. the City of
Boston. Before the Supreme Court of Massachusetts 13 (Dec. 4, 1849) (transcript
available in State University of N.Y. Library).
34. Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 204 (1849).
35. Sumner, supra note 33, at 30.
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helped coin another long-lived legal phrase, "separate but equal," by
seizing the other horn of the dilemma to contend that separation
aided, not harmed, black students. Chandler further argued that
the committee had "a right to maintain special schools for colored
children, such schools being, in all respects, as good as those for
white children.""6
Faced with the these starkly different stories of equal rights,
the court, speaking through Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw, emphati-
cally rejected the arguments of Sarah's lawyers. Like all judges of
competing courtroom stories, Shaw not only had to choose one tale
over the other but also craft his own."7 As in most of his seminal
opinions, "reasonableness" served as the cornerstone of his opin-
ion.3" Segregation earned his stamp of approval as a reasonable
use of the school committee's power to classify students. He accept-
ed that "upon great deliberation" the committee had 'come to the
conclusion, that the good of both classes of schools will be best pro-
moted by maintaining the separate primary schools for colored and
for white children, and we can perceive no ground to doubt, that
this is the honest result of their experience and judgment."39 Con-
versely, he dismissed Morris and Sumner's contentions that this
policy violated the Massachusetts constitutional right of equal pro-
tection under the law." Shaw reasoned that equality did not re-
quire the same treatment for all groups.41 Indeed, he specifically
rejected such an expansive reading of the state's constitution:
The great principle, advanced by the learned and eloquent advocate
of the plaintiff, is, that by the constitution and laws of Massachu-
setts, all persons without distinction of age or sex, birth or color,
origin or condition, are equal before the law. This, as a broad gen-
eral principle, such as ought to appear in a declaration of rights, is
perfectly sound; it is not only expressed in terms, but pervades and
animates the whole spirit of our constitution of free government.
But, when this great principle comes to be applied to the actual
36. Darling, supra note 18, at 132-33.
37. Kim Lane Scheppele argues, for example, that the "resolution of any indi-
vidual case relies heavily on a court's adoption of a particular story, one that makes
sense, is true to what the listeners know about the world, and hangs together." Kim
L. Scheppele, Foreward, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2080 (1989) (introducing legal story-
telling symposium). She adds, "Stories may diverge, then, not because one is true
and the other false, but because they are both self-believed descriptions coming from
different points of view informed by different background assumptions about how to
make sense of events." Id. at 2082.
38. For the most thorough discussion of Shaw's judicial career, see LEONARD W.
LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW passim (1957).
39. Roberts, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) at 209.
40. Id. at 206.
41. Id, at 206-07.
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and various conditions of persons in society, it will not warrant the
assertion, that men and women are legally clothed with the same
civil and political powers, and that children and adults are legally
to have the same functions and be subject to the same treatment;
but only that the rights of all, as they are settled and regulated by
law, are equally entitled to the paternal consideration and protec-
tion of the law, for their maintenance and security. What those
rights are, to which individuals, in the infinite variety of circum-
stances by which they are surrounded in society, are entitled, must
depend on law adapted to their respective relations and condi-
tions.42
Finally, though often eager to use law as an instrument for
reallocating economic rights and even criminal penalties, Justice
Shaw resisted using it to aid Sarah. "It is urged," he sagely conclud-
ed
that this maintenance of separate schools tends to deepen and
perpetuate the odious distinction of caste, founded in a deep-rooted
prejudice in public opinion. This prejudice, if it exists, is not creat-
ed by law, and probably cannot be changed by law. Whether this
distinction and prejudice, existing in the opinion and feelings of the
community, would not be as effectually fostered by compelling col-
ored and white children to associate together in the same schools,
may well be doubted."'
In consigning Sarah to a segregated school, the leading state jurist
of antebellum America used her story to enter the notion of "sep-
arate but equal" in the American legal and educational lexicon and
to legitimate segregation as a way to resolve the dilemma of dif-
ference. Thus, his decision gave legal sanction to a caste system for
American families that promoted the construction of separate racial
tracks in the "race for life."
Though critical for the way that law would henceforth frame
the debate about racial segregation and the educational rights of
minorities, the encounter in Shaw's courtroom was only part of
Sarah's legal experience. Her father, Benjamin Roberts, and many
other integrationists refused to accept the court's conclusion as
either the legitimate meaning of equal educational rights or the
final expression of the law. Benjamin Roberts went on a speaking
tour promoting school integration as he and his allies continued
their campaign. They staged boycotts, lobbied, and even organized
another test case. But try as they might, the integrationists could
not escape Shaw's words. By going to law, they had allowed him to
42. IdN. at 205-06.
43. Id. at 209.
44. See id at 205-06.
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use his power to define the meaning of equal rights. Consequently,
legally sanctioned segregation could only end with a legislative
.directive striking down the Chief Justice's "separate but equal"
dictum and thereby denying the school committee the right to clas-
sify students according to race. Such a legislative edict came in
1855 when the Massachusetts state legislature passed a school
integration bill decreeing that in the common schools "no distinction
shall be made on account of the race, color, or religious opinions, of
the applicant or scholars."" The integrationist ideal of equal oppor-
tunity to education as a legitimate family claim had finally tri-
umphed. Bay State parents could claim the right to equip their
children for the "race for life" without the hobbles imposed by for-
mally segregated schooling.
Yet the nature of this victory is ambiguous, as indeed is the
meaning of Sarah's legal experience. The school committee reacted
to the law by closing the black schools and firing black teachers.
Even more telling, despite the legislation, a decade later northern-
style de facto segregation had sprouted in Boston.45 And, not sur-
prisingly, over a century later, Boston families would once again fill
the streets with protests for and against segregation.4 ' At the same
time, Shaw's "separate but equal" doctrine led a long doctrinal life,
particularly after being enshrined in Plessy v. Ferguson. Indeed,
as recent critiques of the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education9 deci-
sion illustrate, Shaw's doctrine still helps frame debates about equal
education today."
More fundamentally, Sarah's courtroom story illustrates how
deeply embedded the dilemma of difference became in the legal
construction of children's educational rights and family duties. Con-
tests over the meaning of equality, which phrased the issue as one
between segregation and integration, became chronic and subject
only to generational solutions. These fights had clear consequences
for the status of minority families and opportunities of children in
those families. Indeed Sarah's story suggested how deeply embed-
45. Kousser, supra note 18, at 989 n.225.
46. BELL, supra note 19, at 368.
47. See, e.g., J. ANTHONY LUKAs, COMMON GROUND: A TURBULENT DECADE IN
THE LIVES OF THREE AMERICAN FAMILiEs 253-76 (1985) (discussing near-riot condi-
tions in Boston on first day of busing).
48. 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896); see also Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kentucky,
179 U.S. 388 (1900) (following Plessy); BELL, supra note 19, at 368-77 (discussing
Plessy).
49. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
50. See, e.g., Steven A. Holmes, Look Whos Saying Separate is Equal, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 1995, § 4 (Week in Review), at 1, 5.
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ded the segregation impulse was in those constructions. It is worth
emphasizing that only racial classifications came under attack.
Classifications by class, age, gender, or intelligence not only won
approval, but were even used with little controversy both to rein-
force and to contest the racial line and thus to help construct indi-
vidual identity and family status. The integration ideal had a much
more tenuous foothold in the law and society, yet its place in the
debate suggests the inherent instability of all time-bound solutions
that relied on law to resolve the dilemma of difference, as the re-
cently renewed debate over school integration reminds us.
Sarah lived through the entire process of segregation, integra-
tion, and resegregation. Her legal experience was, and would be,
shared by other Boston students, black and white. Her story, broad-
cast widely in the abolitionist press and many daily newspapers,
helped construct theirs. For that reason it is best thought of as a
precedent of legal experience. 'The antebellum Massachusetts civil
rights campaigns strike familiar chords," Kousser argues, "partly
because ideas, tactics, and theories have-unbeknownst to us-been
passed from generation to generation as folk wisdom, and partly
because only a limited number of rather obvious strategies exist for
dealing with the continuing dilemma of racial discrimination."51
Like most children in critical courtroom stories, though unlike
the other two tales I will tell, Sarah's voice is silent in the historical
record. Yet some children may well have voiced her sense of what
was at stake in her case. At a December 17, 1855, celebration of the
passage of the integration statute, student Frederick Lewis deliv-
ered a congratulatory address to the legislative leader of the cam-
paign. He voiced the hope of family-sponsored individual success,
which lay at the heart of the continuing battle over equal education:
"Champion of Equal School Rights, we hail thee! ... Noble friend!
thou hast opened for us the gate that leadeth to rich treasures."5 2
B. Lewis Winchell
The same year that Sarah Roberts's story unfolded in the Mas-
sachusetts courts, Lewis Winchell had his own legal experience
many miles away in a Chicopee township common school. It began
on January 10 when he refused to changeI seats as his teacher or-
dered. Resistance brought a beating. Lewis then charged his teach-
er, S.M. Cook, with assault and battery. Lewis's charges were hard-
ly unique. Complaints against the overzealous use of the rod domi-
51. Kousser, supra note 18, at 1009.
52. JIM CROW, supra note 18, at 268.
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nated public criticism of the schools. Yet few students or parents
translated their concerns into legal complaints. By doing so, Lewis
and his parents not only raised the stakes in his own struggle, but
forced a courtroom confrontation and a clear declaration of the com-
plicated tangle of rights and duties that governed the new and am-
biguous relationship between parents, students, and teachers in an
era when diverse family practice challenged school officials' assump-
tions of a common standard of behavior and discipline. As a result,
his case helped demarcate the boundaries between the autonomy of
families and the authority of schools. Lewis's case became a crimi-
nal-law story in which Lewis played the accuser.
Lewis had engaged in a test of wills with his teacher, Cook.53
After Lewis refused to change seats, Cook had seized the youth by
the collar and threw him down on the teaching platform in the front
of the room. Lewis dared Cook to do it again. When he did, Lewis
called him a "damned fool." The teacher then pushed him into an-
other room. Lewis escaped through a window yelling, "[T]ell .Cook
from me that he is a damned fool; my father will attend to the
case." Lewis returned the next day telling a classmate that his fa-
ther had told him "not to take it from the schoolmaster or anybody
else-old Cook would not dare to touch him-and if he did the old
man would be up there and turn him out pretty quick." Once again
Lewis sat in his old seat. This time, though, when Cook asked him
to move, he grudgingly complied. The teacher, however, was not
satisfied. After the morning lessons, Cook lectured the class on the
consequences of resisting authority, the right of a teacher to seat
pupils for the best interest of the school, and Lewis's offenses of
profane language and insubordination. He then said he would make
an example of Lewis so that others would realize that misconduct
would not and should not go unpunished. Cook brought Lewis up to
the platform and demanded that he stick out his hand to be caned.
Lewis refused, but Cook started whipping his legs with an apple
tree limb. Lewis still refused to hold out his hand; the teacher con-
tinued the whipping. Finally, after what witnesses reported as any-
where from 50 to 132 blows, Lewis cried out, "[Y]ou have conquered
me." He apologized and Cook sent him to his new seat. A few days
later, Lewis's father had a warrant served on Cook.54
Unlike Sarah's, but like most cases, Lewis's courtroom story
began and ended in a trial court. Lewis's story would have sunk
into the legal oblivion reserved for most cases had it not been for
53. Schoolmaster and Pupil, THE MASS. TEACHER, Sept. 1849, at 257-59. The
facts are taken from the text of the article.
54. For another version of the story, see KATZ, supra note 11, at 129-30.
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The Massachusetts Teacher. The state's leading professional journal
turned Commonwealth v. Cook into a precedent of legal experience
when it plucked the case from the legal dustbin because it present-
ed "principles involving the rights of both teacher and pupil, in a
clear and lucid manner, which render it valuable for reference in
any other occurrence of similar character." The Boston-based jour-
nal insisted that teachers, not parents, must govern the classroom,
and that every teacher "should understand his rights as well as
duties, and require, with judgment and firmness, that they shall be
respected .... ."5
The caution was necessary because corporal punishment had
become a highly contested issue in schools around the state and the
nation. The age-old use of the rod to discipline the young suddenly
came under attack.55 Though linked to other humanitarian strug-
gles of the era, especially campaigns against excessive punishments,
the contest over corporal punishment in the schools became a dis-
tinct controversy. It drew on new ideas and practices about the
home as well as the school. The central issues "were whether school
children under any circumstances had the right to be undeferential,
uncooperative, or aggressive in school and whether parents under
any circumstances had the right to intervene on the side of their
children in disciplinary matters.""
The struggle over punishment was additionally a fundamental-
ly gendered debate about male violence. Critics and proponents
alike agreed that the rod should rarely, if at all, be used on girls.
Finally, almost no one argued for an absolute ban on corporal pun-
ishment; instead, debate .focused on questions of abuse: physical
abuse and abuse of power.5"
Two concerns were tantamount and turned the controversy into
a clash of rights. First, the contradictory commands that schools
both mold the child into a disciplined worker and also set him or
her free to be a responsible citizen of the republic challenged the
use of the rod as a means of maintaining order. To an increasing
number of parents, reformers, and students, frequent reliance on
corporal punishment seemed an arbitrary means of achieving order
at the expense of liberty and was seen as a practice that stunted
independent growth. Moreover, it seemed a violation of students'
55. Schoolmaster and Pupil, supra note 54, at 257.
56. For a broad discussion of the emergence of corporal punishment as an issue
in the Massachusetts schools, see KAESTLE & VINovsKIs, supra note 11, at 150-85.
57. Kaestle, supra note 12, at 13.
58. See MYRA C. GLENN, CAMPAIGNS AGAINST CORPORAL PUNISHMENT: PRISON-
ERS, SAILORS, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 13-21, 23-61 (1984).
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rights, a set of legal protections being articulated on a mass scale
for the first time. And, as has been the case ever since, student
rights emerged as a particular dialect of rights talk. This turned
children's distinct need for nurture and training into a form of
rights, while discounting the importance of the autonomous claims
of the young against the state and other individuals that character-
ized adult rights. 9 Lawyer and writer of school texts, Lyman Cobb
made the peculiar status of juvenile rights clear in an 1847 polemic
against corporal punishment:
Many parents and teachers treat children or pupils as though they
have no rights, in common with their other fellow-citizens, and
sometimes as if they were not even human beings .... Children, in
consequence of their inexperience and helplessness have a right to
claim the exercise of patience and forbearance toward them by
their parents and teachers... . All parents and teachers will agree
in this-that children have a right to breathe the air of heaven. If
so, then, they have a right to food and clothing. The right to have
amusement. The right to receive moral and religious instruction.
The right to be heard in their own defense, when they are charged
with any offense or crime. The right to weep, and the right to
laugh.60
Reformers like Cobb admonished teachers, and parents, to use mor-
al suasion rather than the rod to quell student disobedience when-
ever possible.
Second, the conflict over corporal punishment in the schools
provoked a clash over the boundaries between parental and teacher
authorit , and thus, rights. As Kaestle suggests, "Conflict over
school discipline centered not so much upon what values were to be
taught, but on how much authority the teacher should have over
children and what authority the parents retained."61 Equally im-
portant, the conflict stemmed from the new assertion that the
teacher stood in loco parentis. Such claims generally had been asso-
ciated only with residential colleges, but battles with parents led
other educators to claim that right as well. Many teachers and
school committees, particularly in urban schools, placed the blame
for student insubordination squarely on parents. A textbook for
normal school children lamented: "[Glood government in the family
59. See Michael Grossberg, Children's Legal Rights? A Historical Look at a Legal
Paradox, in CHILDREN AT RISK IN AMERICA, HISTORY, CONCEPTS, AND PUBLIC PoLIcY
111-34 (Roberta Wollons ed., 1993) (discussing ambiguous history of children's
rights).
60. LYMAN COBB, THE EVIL TENDENCIES OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT AS A MEANS
OF MORAL DISCIPLINE IN FAMILIES AND SCHOOLS, EXAMINED AND DISCUSSED 196
(1847) (emphasis omitted).
61. Kaestle, supra note 12, at 8.
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is the exception and not the rule. Parents indulge their children at
home, nay, indirectly train them to utter lawlessness."62 Similarly
worried about the slippery slope to rebellion, the Lawrence, Massa-
chusetts, school committee warned that children
first learned to trample upon authority in the sanctuary of the
home; parental overfondness looked on with indifference .... They
next violated the authority of the school; the parent permitted it
unrebuked, and, in come cases, with the smile of approbation. The
last and legitimate step, was, to throw the reins upon their own
necks and bid defiance to all law, human and divine.
In defending their use of the rod, teachers like Cook emphasized the
need to maintain order in classrooms and the need to instill dis-
cipline in their charges to make them model workers and citizens.
They too turned needs into rights: the teacher's right to maintain
order in the classroom.
Though few took their complaints against excessive punishment
to court like Lewis's father, many parents did object to specific uses
of corporal punishment as violations of their rights and those of
their children. In response, teachers and school officials defended
corporal punishment as a necessary last resort to prevent classroom
rebellion and to uphold the rights and authority of instructors.
A few years before Lewis's struggle with Cook, disagreement
over the answers to those questions had boiled over in Boston. In
his famous Seventh Report in 1843, Massachusetts Secretary of
Education Horace Mann questioned the utility and morality of cor-
poral punishment. A two-year pamphlet war ensued with corporal
punishment the stalking horse for larger questions of individual,
family, and school governance and rights as well as for religious
conflicts between liberal Christians and orthodox Calvinists over
schooling and punishment."
Though he did not favor total abolition, Mann placed restricting
the rod alongside other attempts to professionalize the state's teach-
ing corps. He considered schools "families away from home" and,
like his professional foes, regarded teachers as substitute parents:
"([Als the master stands in place of the parent; he should perform
the duty of a parent; and examine closely the characters, morals
62. Id at 10.
63. Id. (quoting Lawrence School Report, Lawrence, Mass. 1848).
64. For a collection of Mann's work, including his exchanges with the schoolmas-
ters, see HORACE MANN, Lim AND WoRDs or HORACE MANN 2, 4 (1891). See also
GLENN, supra note 59, at 103-12, 121-26 (detailing recent account of conflict); HAR-
OLD SCHWARTZ, SAMUEL GRIDLEY HOWE: SOcIAL REFORMER, 1801-1876, at 120-36
(1956) (same).
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and habits of each pupil."'
However, Mann wanted teachers and parents alike to lay down
the rod and make greater use of reason and moral suasion. He cam-
paigned to make discipline through voluntary compliance, rather
than abject submission, one measure of a successful teacher. Signifi-
cantly, he phrased it in terms of the rights of children, and made
the anti-republican consequences of too great a reliance on the rod
clear: "fHe who has been a serf until the day before his twenty-one
years of age, cannot be an independent citizen the day after; and it
makes no difference whether he has been a serf in Austria or Amer-
ica .... The fitting apprenticeship for self-government consists in
being trained to self-government.5 6
The Association of Boston Schoolmasters immediately rejected
Mann's call to lay aside the rod as they did his demands for new
standards of professional competence and limits on school-district
autonomy. They accused Mann of opposing necessary government in
the classroom. Proper schooling, the Association argued, required
that students understand their duty to obey all "rightful authority,
wherever it exists in the great chain, from the highest to the low-
est."' Obedience must be "entire, unqualified submission" that on-
ly the rod could ensure.' The schoolmasters dismissed out of hand
the claim that moral suasion alone could effectively govern stu-
dents. Insubordination like Lewis's had to be repressed through
physical punishment. Only the rod would save boys like him from
the "dungeon and the halter in maturer life." 9 To resist Mann's
attempt at bureaucratic centralization as well as other constraints
on their authority, the schoolmasters formed a statewide organiza-
tion, the Massachusetts Teachers Federation in 1845. The Massa-
chusetts Teacher became its official journal and Commonwealth v.
Cook a courtroom story worth reprinting.
Subscribers learned that Lewis had carried the fight over corpo-
ral punishment to the courtroom. They also discovered, as had Lew-
is and Cook, that the law had its own particular way of presenting
and resolving the issues. Where constitutional claims of equality
and counterclaims of administrative discretion had dominated Sa-
rah Roberts's courtroom story, the doctrine of in loco parentis and
the criminal law of assault and battery scripted Lewis's courtroom
experience. As Judge Hooker made clear in rendering his summary
65. SCHULTZ, supra note 11, at 67.
66. WELTER, supra note 6, at 98.
67. GLENN, supra note 59, at 109.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 110.
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judgment at the end of a two-day trial, these laws allowed clashes
over corporal punishment to be redefined as legal matters involving
the reasonableness of individual acts and the proper balancing of
rights claims."
Judge Hooker accepted Cook's version of the story and used it
to stake out the line between the authority of families and schools
over the young. He concluded that the teacher had acted "in the
lawful and necessary discharge of his duty in sustaining his author-
ity in the school, and in correcting said Winchell for offenses com-
mitted by him" Hooker defended Cook's authority by declaring that
a teacher, being in loco parentis, must be considered to have the
same powers as a father, including the right of correction. Like a
father, a teacher must maintain "good government in the little com-
munity over which he presides," and "the law ought never interfere
with either, except in extreme cases of wrong doing."n Judge Hook-
er advised teachers to preserve order through moral suasion and
mild punishments whenever possible, but declared that 'the law
sanctions a resort to corporal chastisement, whenever it becomes
necessary for maintaining his authority and preserving order in the
school."72 He even made the use of corporal punishment to pre-
serve order "an imperative duty" of teachers and a necessary prereq-
uisite to expulsion. 3
Besides demarcating teachers' common-law rights, the judge
also explained their criAhinal liability. Intent was the issue, and in-
tent could only be determined by the circumstances of the stories
told in the courtroom. Like other commentators on the legality of
corporal punishment from Samuel Johnson to Cobb, Judge Hooker
insisted that criminal liability flowed only from acts of passion,
malevolence, or vindictiveness. However, the judge warned teachers
that while errors in judgment would not be punished by criminal
penalties, they could be subject to civil damages for negligence. 4
Hooker admitted that his defense of Cook's punishment of Lew-
is might well leave students and parents without a legal remedy
"when a schoolmaster is rigorous in his punishments beyond what
70. For a general discussion of the legal issues involved in cases like this one,
see Emma J. Hirschberger, A Study of the Development of the In Loco Parentis
Doctrine, Its Application and Emerging Trends (1974) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Pittsburgh); and Dennis P. Burke, A Study of Court Cases Resulting
from Corporal Punishment in Public Schools (1958) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Pittsburgh, School of Education).
71. Schoolmaster and Pupil, supra note 54, at 259.
72. Id. at 260.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 260-61.
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is reasonable and injudicious and rash in his modes of discipline."75
However, like Justice Shaw in Sarah's case, he trumpeted public
opinion as the most effective control on school officials' authority.
Indeed, Judge Hooker counseled that complaint to a school commit-
tee served far better as a mode of redress for aggrieved parents
"both in its bearings upon the good of the child and the interests of
the school, than to make an appeal to the law, either in a civil or
criminal proceeding." 6
By relying on the doctrine of in loco parentis, the rules of crimi-
nal law, and the force of public sentiment, Judge Hooker not only
supported Cook's story of the conflict, he silenced Lewis just as
Shaw had silenced Sarah. Students' rights had no place in this
judge's understanding of law. In his construction of the relationship
between the family and the school, the only rights clash was that of
parent and teacher. To emphasize that point, Hooker ended his
opinion with a stern rebuke to Lewis: "The boy, Lewis Winchell,
assumed at the outset an attitude of defiance; and through the
whole manifested a determined spirit of rebellion against the au-
thority of the master, by open and violent acts of resistance, and the
most insolent and profane language."7 Cook, on the other hand,
had acted in a suitably "calm and deliberate manner" and, "though
marked with some degree of severity," his punishment was not
"disproportionate to the offence [sic], nor continued beyond what
was necessary to subdue the boy."78 Consequently, the judge would
not substitute his judgment for the teacher's and consider whether
a different course of action might have been preferable. Instead, he
ruled in Cook's favor. 9
Judge Hooker's verdict echoed the appellate cases of the era.'
Not all teachers were as fortunate as Cook in escaping guilty ver-
dicts. However, teachers and the students and parents who accused
them faced the same legal constructions of their courtroom stories.
At law, the debate over corporal punishment created more than a
75. Id. at 261.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 261-62.
78. Id. at 262.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Cooper v. McJunkdn, 4 Ind. 290, 292 (1853); Stevens v. Fassett, 27
Me. 266, 278-79 (1847) (finding that teacher has authority "to reduce [a pupil] to
obedience"); State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 348, 349 (1837) (finding that teachers may
exercise discretion in meting out punishment); Commonwealth v. Fell, 11 Haz. Reg.
179 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1833); Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 113, 114--15 (1859) (finding that
teacher has authority to discipline child in parents' absence); JAMES KENT, 2 COM-
MENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 169-70 (1827), (noting that teachers assume authority
of father in classroom).
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body of rules to determine the reasonable use of violence in the
classroom. Experiences like Lewis's were also used to make the
school a distinct patriarchal preserve, similar but separate from the
home on which it was modeled. In the school, as in the home, the
law sanctioned the use of the rod and other forms of traditionally
paternal power by teachers, male or female, to fulfill the mission of
educating the young. Courtroom victories helped school officials
resist challenges from students and parents alike. The legal con-
struction of the rights of students, parents, and teachers thus en-
sured that the power of the rod always stood behind a teacher's
command. And coming as it did at a crucial time in the conceptual-
ization of students' rights, judgments like Hooker's decision in
Lewis's case also gave legal justification to the subordination of
students. The legal rules assumed that students like Lewis were
immature, incompetent, and thus in need of steady supervision and
that virtue must be taught in the classroom because it could not be
learned in either the home or the community. These assumptions
were part of an ongoing process of Anglo-American educational
change that had begun in the seventeenth century and in which
"[elvery subsequent increment of protective affection for the child
had been simultaneously an invasion of the child's competence and
an augmentation of his incapacity.".' For these reasons, The Mas-
sachusetts Teacher publicized the lessons of Lewis's story as widely
as possible.
But the law stood only partially apart from society, and the
power of popular sentiment that Shaw and Hooker invoked so easily
could in fact alter the distribution of power in the schoolhouse.
Equally important, reprinting Commonwealth v. Cook had multiple
consequences because The Massachusetts Teacher did not have a
monopoly on the story's interpretation. Thus, despite judicial vindi-
cation of teachers' rights and campaigns by the Boston schoolmas-
ters and their allies, the protests of parents, students, and reform-
ers did have an impact. In fact, Kaestle suggests that "parents who
protested corporal punishment by teachers may have played a more
important role than pedagogical reformers in the eventual limita-
tion of school beatings.""2 Whatever the exact sources, corporal
punishment fell under a cloud of illegitimacy from which it would
never re-emerge, and its use declined after 1840.' Even The Mas-
81. Michael Zuckerman, Children's Rights: The Failure of a Reform, 2 POLY
ANALYSIS, 371, 376-77 (1976). See generally id. at 371-85 (describing history of mod-
em concept of childhood).
82. Kaestle, supra note 12, at 16.
83. GLENN, supra note 59, at 136.
No. 2] 451
UTAH LAW REVIEW
sachusetts Teacher, though it continued to defend the legitimacy of
corporal punishment, urged teachers to replace 'the debasing and
repulsive bond of fear" with the "silken cord of love.'"' In schools,
disciplining the mind slowly displaced punishing the body. Never-
theless, public sentiment would wax and wane, and the rod would
never disappear from the classroom nor would struggles between
teachers, students, and parents over the line between the family
and the school.
C. Thomas Wall
Ten years after Sarah and Lewis's experiences with the law,
Thomas Wall had his own courtroom encounter. In many ways,
Thomas's experience replicated both Sarah's and Lewis's because it
raised questions about the constitutional protection of family values
nd the legitimacy of corporal punishment. His story began on Mon-
day morning, March 7, 1859, when the Catholic student refused to
recite portions of the King James version of the Bible and the Prot-
estant version of the Ten Commandments. Repeated resistance led
first to his being kept after school, then to a shouting match be-
tween the school principal and his father, and finally to a confronta-
tion with submaster, or assistant principal, McLaurin Cook. When
Thomas again refused, Cook began beating him with a rattan rod
until he complied. Cook, like his namesake in Chicopee, found him-
self in a police court arraigned on charges of assault and battery.
He had become the defendant in a courtroom story that would be
called The Eliot School Case.85
Like the stories of Sarah and Lewis, Thomas's story also arose
out of long-standing conflicts over the intergenerational transfer of
values and skills as well as the clashing authority of families and
schools. His case erupted into public consciousness as a precedent of
legal experience because of the volatility of the issue of religious
instruction in the public schools and its direct relationship to unset-
tling questions about the meaning of constitutional guarantees of
religious freedom and separation of church and state. Bible reading
in the public schools became the focus of popular and legal conten-
tion in Massachusetts and other states, particularly after the mas-
sive immigration of Irish Catholics in the 1840s and 1850s." These
84. Id. at 126 (quoting The Influences of the Teacher's Example, THE MASS.
TEACHER, Apr. 1849, 109-11).
85. The case is recoverable only through newspaper accounts. See 2 ROBERT H.
LORD ET AL., HISTORY OF THE ARCHDIOCESE OF BOSTON IN THE VARIOUS STAGES OF
ITS DEVELOPMENT, 1604 TO 1943, at 587-601 (1944) (providing most thorough discus-
sion of the case).
86. See WILLIAm K. DUNN, WHAT HAPPENED TO RELIGIOUS EDUCATION? THE
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struggles posed particular problems of minority and majority rights.
Unlike some other religious and utopian groups in the era, such as
the Mormons and the Shakers, who retreated from active engage-
ment in public life, Irish Catholics were among a "number of
ethnocultural groups that wanted to participate in the mainstream
of American political and economic life but resisted the attempts of
Americanizers to promote a homogeneous culture and rejected the
demands of evangelical Protestants that schools use Bible reading
as the basis of 'nonsectarian' moral training."'7 Boston, which in
1855 included almost 50,000 Irish among its citizenry of 160,000,
became one of the main battle grounds of this religious war.'
The seeds of Thomas's confrontation with Cook had been plant-
ed years before. Though in most states Bible reading was a custom-
ary practice, it had been required in the Boston schools since 1789.
Rearmed in 1826, this policy provoked a clash among Protestants
in the 1840s. Intertwined with the struggles over professionalizing
the schools, the issue raised knotty problems about the definition of
nonsectarianism. Despite widespread agreement that the schools
should teach values and that moral instruction must inevitably be
grounded in religion, differences emerged over just how sectarian
the instruction should be. Fights erupted over whether denomina-
tional books could be used in the schools and over the manner in
which Bible readings were conducted. By the 1850s, however, an
uneasy compromise had been engineered by the secretary of the
state school board, Horace Mann. A Protestant consensus decreed
that nonsectarianism would mean reading the King James Bible
without comment-that is, in Mann's words, letting it "speak for
itself."89
Catholics, of course, thought it spoke blasphemy and challenged
the policy as an obvious attempt to proselytize their children and an
invasion of their parental right to teach their faith to their off-
spring. They rejected the Protestant version of nonsectarianism and
advanced their own: Catholic students should be given the right to
DECLINE OF RELIGIOUS TEACHING IN THE PUBLIC ELEMENTARY SCHOOL, 1776-1851, at
117-303 (1958) (containing thorough discussion of religious education in Massachu-
setts during this period).
87. BENAVOT, supra note 7, at 130.
88. SCHULTZ, supra note 11, at 214-15 (charting percentage of native and for-
eign population of Boston). See generally i&L at 279-309 (discussing state coercion and
children of poverty).
89. See, e.g., RAYIOND B. CULVER, HORACE MANN AND RELIGION IN THE MASSA-
CHUSETTS PUBLIC SCHOOLS passim (1929) (discussing Mann's role in compromise); see
also KENNETH CMIEL, DEMOCRATIC ELOQUENCE: THE FIGHT OVER POPULAR SPEECH IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 96-110 (1990) (discussing debate over King James Bi-
ble).
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read and recite their version of scriptures, the Douay Bible." Par-
ents and priests threatened boycotts and court challenges. Many
Catholic parents simply kept their children home despite an 1852
law mandating school attendance for at least twelve weeks a year.
Their newspaper, The Boston Pilot, called the enforcers of Protes-
tantism "bigots" and portrayed the struggles as a rights contest:
"We have a constitutional right to demand that all sectarian matter
be banished from the schools, and that the faith of Catholic children
shall not be either openly or covertly assailed."
Protestant school leaders and legislators responded by tighten-
ing the rules. Riding the high tide of antebellum xenophobia, they
enacted a series of regulations imposing compulsory attendance at
Bible classes and specifying how Bible reading would take place.
The policies assumed that the majority had a right to dictate the
religious instruction of the minority against the will of their par-
ents. For these officials, family rights did not include the power of
minorities to determine what values would be taught to children in
the public schools. The Boston school committee made its position
clear in 1853: "The ends of government therefore require that reli-
gious instruction should be given in our Public Schools .... The
whole character of the instruction given, must be such and such
only, as will tend to make the pupils thereof, American citizens, and
ardent supporters of American institutions."92 Schoolmasters used
punishment and expulsions to enforce the policy.
Catholic resistance to what they considered a violation of their
religious and family rights led to Thomas's refusal to recite the
King James version of the Lord's Prayer. A compromise had been
worked out at Eliot School, where three-fourths of the 800 students
were Irish Catholic. These students had been allowed to make
whatever changes conformed to Catholic texts. On March 7, though,
Thomas's teacher, Miss Shepard, refused to let Thomas make the
substitution. The confrontation escalated. Thomas's father tried to
get the school to return to the earlier policy. Then on Sunday, the
13th, the local parish priest reportedly warned students not to say
the Protestant version. Thomas complied, vowing: "Faith and I
wan't agoin to repate thim damned Yankee prayers."93 The next
day the crisis erupted when Thomas and hundreds of other Catholic
90. Differences between the two versions included clashing word choices. For in-
stance, the Catholic "hallowed" versus the Protestant "sanctified," and the King
James version's lack of the apocryphal books of the Douay version.
91. THE BOSTON PILOT, Nov. 26, 1852.
92. SCHULTZ, supra note 11, at 307 (quoting THE BOSTON PILOT, Dec. 13, 1851).
93. Id. at 308.
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students remained silent. The students were whipped with a heavy
rattan rod after their refusal. Labeling Thomas the ringleader, Cook
entered Shepard's class and declared, "Here's a boy who refuses to
repeat the Ten Commandments, and IMI whip him till he yields if it
takes the whole afternoon." Thomas held out for thirty minutes
until, with cut and bleeding hands, he finally repeated the Com-
mandments. He and 300 other students were expelled.94 The next
day, Thomas's father made good on the long-standing threat to re-
sort to the law by filing charges against Cook and thereby linked
the constitutional claim to religious freedom to the criminal law
complaint of abusive behavior.
Catholic claims of a right to nonsectarian education, however,
faced a frosty legal reception. In case after case, judges around the
republic had rejected a Catholic reading of federal and state consti-
tutions, just as school committees had rejected their version of the
Bible. Three questions dominated the litigation: Was the Bible a
sectarian book? If not, and most courts said it was not, could it be
used without note or comment as a textbook? Lastly, could students
be compelled to participate in Bible reading? Affirmative answers to
the last two questions came in most cases as courts rebuffed Catho-
lic challenges to school committees. 5
The judges who would hear Thomas's story had to interpret it
according to the precedent of Donahue v. Richards.96 Five years
before the Eliot School confrontation, a Maine school board had
expelled fifteen-year-old Bridget Donahue for refusing to read the
King James Bible. Her priest and father had told her it was sinful
to use the Protestant Bible. Her lawyers argued that the require-
ment'preferred Protestants over Catholics and amounted to a reli-
gious test. The result, they contended, was an unconscionable ma-
jority rule:
[Als protestants regard instruction in protestant christianity as the
most essential branch of education, therefore if the majority of the
school be protestants, the committee may enforce such a system of
instruction upon all; and Mahomedans, catholics, or Mormons may
follow their example if they get power. "The greatest good of the
greatest number." This tyrannical doctrine of pure democracy, we
generally hear only from the lips of demagogues.7
94. 2 LORD, supra note 86, at 592-94.
95. See OTtO T. HAmLTON, THE CouRTs AND THE CuRPIcuLum 73-113 (1927)
(analyzing court decisions relating to religion and Bible in public schools); see also
DONALD E. BoLEs, THE Two SwoRDs: COINENTARIES AND CASES ON RELIGION AND
EDUCATION 83-117 (1967) (same).
96. 38 Me. 379 (1854).
97. Id- at 387.
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The court disagreed, and concluded that the Bible was not used
for sectarian instruction but as a textbook properly calculated to ful-
fill the state constitutional mandate to instruct children in virtue.
The court also accepted the assimilationist goals of the Bible-read-
ing policy and declared that mandating the King James Bible did
not infringe on freedom of worship. Lastly, the Maine justices em-
phatically rejected Bridget's claim to exercise her right of freedom of
conscience. Students, the court ruled, had no right to review the
curriculum; only the state had such authority. As Sarah and Lewis
had learned, student-rights claims like Bridgets were simply too
inchoate to secure recognition from the American bench." The ju-
ryless Boston police court treated Thomas's story of victimization
and violated rights in a similar fashion. The trial, prominently re-
ported in the Boston press, made Bible reading, not corporal pun-
ishment, the central issue. Donahue v. Richards controlled the pro-
ceedings. The prosecutors, Sidney Webster and Wilder Dwight, tried
to restrain the passions of the moment. They only argued that
Thomas should not have been forced to use a version of the Bible
forbidden by his church or punished for disobeying his teacher at
the order of his father.
Henry F. Durant, representing the school committee, showed
no such caution. He ridiculed Thomas and his father and called
them liars. Durant refused to accept the proposition that they had
acted, or even could have acted, out of conscience. With equal vehe-
mence he rebuffed Thomas's claims to student rights. Citing
Donahue, he declared:
It is idle to say that the Catholics do not have equal rights because
we do not give them supreme rights; that they do not have equal
rights because they cannot, at the will of their priests, compel us to
forbid the use of the Bible in our public schools."
In fact, Durant addressed the dilemma of difference quite different-
ly than Shaw had in Sarah's case, spurred in part perhaps by rising
fears that Catholics might demand public funds for parochial
schools. In Thomas's case Durant argued that equal education for
the Irish meant forced integration, not mandatory segregation. He
appealed to the Irish
to abandon as most dangerous and injurious to the true welfare of
their children, the counsels of those who would array them in op-
98. Id- at 379, 387, 409, 413.
99. HENRY F. DURANT, DEFENCE OF THE USE OF THE BIBLE IN THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS 11, 25, 36, 41, 43 (1859).
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position to the laws, who would teach them to separate their chil-
dren from those free schools where all meet beneath the same roof,
speak the same language, learned from the same books and enter
together the great republic of letters."
Insisting that the "Saxon Bible" was nonsectarian, he proclaimed
that it "had been the household god of the schoolroom from the in-
fancy of the country. The schools which make us free, which will
make worthy and true citizens of your children, have grown up
under its influences." Durant ended his tirade by warning Thomas
and his fellow Catholics: "Banish the vain delusion forever that our
Saxon Bible can be taken away; neither foreign tyrants nor foreign
priests will ever have that power."'0 '
Durant!'s story convinced Police Court Judge Maine. Like most
other judges, he believed mandatory readings of the Protestant
Bible to be perfectly legitimate. Such instruction, he argued, did not
violate Thomas's constitutionally protected religious liberty and
freedom of conscience. He also refused to concede a parental right to
determine children's religious education in the public schools and
defined equal education as the right to schooling, not the protection
of minority rights. In addition, as in other corporal punishment cas-
es, Maine relied on the in loco parentis doctrine to contend that by
sending Thomas to the Eliot School, Thomas's father had given up
his right to question the school committee's authority over punish-
ment or even the curriculum. Judge Maine upheld Cook's right to
punish Thomas for insubordination and to flog the boy's hands until
he complied. The judge sent Thomas back to school with the order
that he follow all the rules. The trial ended when the judge dropped
the charges against Cook."2
However, Thomas's legal experiences, like Sarah's and Lewis's,
did not end in the courtroom. Thomas returned to school, but Prot-
estant and Catholic leaders arranged a compromise. Teachers, not
students, would recite the Lord's Prayer and read from the King
James Bible. However, the problem persisted. Some teachers resist-
ed the compromise and continued to force Catholic students to read
the Protestant verses. Finally, in 1862, the legislature repealed the
law making Bible reading compulsory, and the Boston School Com-
mittee declared its willingness to grant students the right to refuse
as an act of conscience. Even so, the state courts continued to up-
hold the constitutionality of Bible reading.' 3 Indeed, Bible reading
100. Id.
10L Id. at 43.
102. 2 LORD, supra note 86, at 600.
103. 2 Id. at 594-601; see also Spiller v. Woburn, 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 127, 128
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in the public schools remained the most litigated religious issue for
the rest of the century. Catholics waged and lost most of the cas-
es.' And they responded, in part, by rejecting Durant's advice
and the example of black Bostonians like Benjamin Roberts and
embracing segregation. By exercising the right to create their own
schools, despite the obvious severe financial consequences for the
parishioners and their church, religious education and indeed the
relationship between family and school would be given a Catholic
meaning. 5 By so doing, they adopted a strategy of struggle in the
public arena based on the conclusion that, as Lucie White argues,
"subordinated groups must create cultural practices through which
they can elaborate an autonomous, oppositional consciousness. " '06
Thomas's courtroom story had laid bare the problems that
arose as the schools tried to draw a new boundary line between
family autonomy over the transmission of values and state authori-
ty over educational content to fulfill the seemingly contradictory
mandates of moral instruction and religious neutrality thought
necessary to educate children. The persistent refusal of Protestant
leaders to recognize Catholic concerns intensified the problem and
made the Bible-reading policy yet another example of a child-help-
ing impulse in America. Zuckerman argues that this policy has been
in some substantial measure a history of a slightly sublimated but
nonetheless real and relentless class and ethno-religious warfare.
Under cover of law-a very special sort of law with a very special
disregard for the rights and liberties of its objects, who were rarely
criminals in any orthodox sense-.. . [such policies took children
from their families] and attempted their forced resocialization to
middle-class Protestant modes.107
The struggles would go on in various guises because of the inherent
instability and indeterminacy of equal education, religious freedom,
student's rights, teacher authority, and family autonomy. The Eliot
School Case revealed just how intractable the conflicts over the
meaning of those words could be.
(1866) (finding statute mandating Bible reading constitutional).
104. BENAVOT, supra note 7, at 163.
105. Id.
106. Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday
Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 48 (1990).
107. Zuckerman, supra note 82, at 383.
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11. CONCLUSION
The stories of Sarah, Lewis, and Thomas, like other stories, can
be told in many ways. They also have multiple meanings. My rendi-
tions of the tales highlight how law has helped define the family in
critical struggles between families and school officials over what
and how to teach the children of the republic. They are thus stories
about how law became a way to express, contest, and legitimate the
new educational order. In the process, they suggest how the Ameri-
can resort to legal means also constructed crucial elements in the
identities of students, parents, and teachers. Equally important,
considering these tales about the "three R's" of race, religion, and
the rod as precedents of legal experience helps us understand how
and why widely publicized legal contests like these broadcast rules
and phrases that helped define the place of the young in antebellum
society. In that way; these cases were building blocks in the cre-
ation of an American law of education and helped determine the
relative authority of families and schools over the intergenerational
transmission of values and skills. Depicted in such terms, these
three courtroom stories also demonstrate the centrality of rights
consciousness in all discussions of education, family, and law.'
The tales of Sarah, Lewis, and Thomas also suggest why a
general commitment to education could not be easily translated into
a stable right to education. Instead they demonstrate why giving
meaning to that right has become a never-ending struggle. The
three students and those who heard their stories learned two fun-
damental, perhaps even contradictory, lessons from their legal expe-
riences. First, they discovered, to their chagrin, what anthropologist
Sally Merry would mean by asserting that "[o]ne aspect of the pow-
er of law is its ability to establish a dominant way of construing
events and to silence others, thus channeling and determining the
outcome of legal proceedings."' 9 In these stories it is clear that
legal constructions helped ensure that families, especially parents,
lost, and continued to lose, much of their control over schooling the
young. Second, the Roberts, Winchells, Walls, and many other fami-
lies also learned something about the limits of the law's power.
Despite the combined efforts of teachers, school officials, and judges
to silence them, their individual and collective struggles continued.
The law also offered them alternative sites, most notably the legis-
lature, and means to contest and assert their rights. Parents like
108. See David Thelen et aL., Rights Consciousness in American History, 74 J. AM.
HIsT. 795, 795-1034 (1987).
109. Sally E. Merry, The Discourse of Mediation and the Power of Naming, 2
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 2 (1990).
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these did not passively accept the hegemony of schools over their
children or relinquish all of their authority over educating their off-
spring to the schools. Instead, school officials constantly had to
negotiate policies with parents and sometimes even students them-
selves. As Kaestle reminds us, "Although we must acknowledge a
gradual loss of parental power and responsibility in many aspects of
education, and although we must guard against romanticizing
'common' people, we can yet redress some past oversights and un-
derstand educational history better by exploring those situations in
which parents have been crucial agents."10 These three stories are
examples of such experiences. They record how and why the balance
of power between families and schools shifted and show that con-
flicts over that balance continued within the new framework.
These courtroom stories tell us that in the past, as in the pres-
ent, Americans have always used the law to shape and contest pub-
lic schooling. As a result of the resort to law, the forums and rules
of the American legal order have helped frame the presentation and
resolution of fundamental educational conflicts. Because of the
growing importance of schooling in the lives of children, the re-
sulting legal solutions have played a critical role in marking out the
boundaries between families and the state. At the same time, those
resolutions have always been generational, not permanent; and thus
inherently unstable and time bound. These struggles as well as the
search for legal resolutions go on, as Fran Cook and Andy Bray
have just learned."' Consequently, I think the basic moral of
these stories is the antebellum creation of a legal right to education
that was very often uniform in rhetoric but contested and variegat-
ed in practice. That is one reason why the stories of Sarah, Lewis,
and Thomas are worth recovering and telling.
110. Kaestle, supra note 12, at 16-17; see also Teitelbaum, supra note 4, at 617.
111. See supra text accompanying note 1 (discussing 1995 case involving teacher's
attempt to secure restraining order and recover damages against unruly student).
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